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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
1.1 Background to the Study 
Politicians have hijacked the transition to democratic governance and are manipulating it to 
guarantee that their privileges are not threatened.
1
Transparency International‟s report notes 
that when citizens vote for representatives and entrust them with state resources and the 
power to make policies on their behalf, some politicians use this opportunity to secure 
benefits for themselves and on behalf of those who funded their political ambitions.
2
Thus, 
political corruption is an Achilles heel of transitional states globally and transitional states in 
the Southern Africa Development Community are no exception.  
Political corruption is equally problematic in other states that are not in transition. However it 
has more dire consequences in states in transition. According to a World Bank policy report 
the problem is most entrenched in transitional states where it undermines the reform projects, 
forces business to operate outside the formal rules, leads to massive looting of resources, and 
discourage investments. Consequently, these countries are at the risk of being trapped in a 
system in which political corruption cuts public revenues, weakens public trust, and 
deteriorates the credibility of the state, unless the necessary reforms are implemented.
3
 
The nexus between political corruption; its causes and negative impact on states emerging 
from civil conflict or authoritarian rule in the SADC region remains empirically under- 
                                                 
1Mukum Mbaku, J (2007:103). 
2Transparency International „Global Political Report (2004) Political Corruption‟ available at 
http://www.transparency.org/global priorities/corruption_politics (accessed on 12 July 2011). 
3  World Bank „Anti-Corruption in Transition: A Contribution to the Policy Debate‟ available at 
info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/17506/contribution.pdf (accessed on 12 July 2011). 
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researched. Hence, it is against this background that this paper is premised as a contribution 
to the growing literature of corruption in transitional states. 
1.2 Research Question 
The main research question is this: How can transitional states, combat political corruption? 
This begs for digression into an enquiry on; what are the causes and conditions of this special 
form of corruption in transitional states; how does political corruption manifest itself, and 
what impact does it have on the establishment of the rule of law, democracy and respect for 
human rights in the SADC region.  
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
The primary purpose of this research is to analyse the typologies, conditions and costs of 
political corruption in the SADC countries as they emerged from conflict and/or autocratic 
regimes. The secondary purpose of this paper is to provide some solutions to curb political 
corruption in these transitional states. The recommendations will take into account the extent 
and nature of the state‟s vulnerability, which is to say, the degree to which the state exposes 
itself to a particular typology of political corruption at a particular point of its transition.  
1.4 Significance of the study 
This paper is of academic and practical relevance. Both the area of international anti-
corruption law and transitional justice are emerging fields of interest to both academics 
(criminologists, economists, social theorists, criminal justice researchers) and practitioners, 
for example, lawyers, police, politicians, policy makers, etc.). Whereas transitional justice 
and anti-corruption law separately have given rise to a considerable volume of literature, the 
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same cannot be said of political corruption in transitional set ups.
4
 While the latter 
phenomenon is known to exist, there is not much written about it, especially insofar as it 
pertains to the Southern Africa region in particular.
5
One reason is that corruption is forever 
changing its appearance, making it difficult to pin down confidently. Also, minimum 
consideration has been paid to the extent to which political corruption influences the course 
of political transitions.
6
 
The significance of this paper lies in the fact that it will show how political corruption makes 
it hard for emerging democracies to grow into stable societies in which economic benefits are 
distributed more equitably throughout society. It will also show that there are ways, not to 
eliminate political corruption altogether, but to make it difficult to prosper at the expense of 
the political and socio-economic interests of Southern African peoples. 
1.5 Literature Review 
The literature utilised in writing this papers mainly from research institutes such as the 
Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Monograph series and the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC) Global Reports. 
As well as, literature from international non-governmental organisations and  aid agencies 
such as; Transparency International (TI) Global Corruption Report (2004) which focuses on 
Political Corruption, International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) the World Bank 
                                                 
4
For this argument see for example Carranza, R (2008: 310). 
5See for example WB Anti-Corruption in Transition the Contribution to Policy Debate, See also OECD (2005), 
Fighting Corruption in Transition Economies: Armenia, OECD, Paris and OECD (2006), Fighting Corruption in 
Transition Economies: A Country Report Series.  
6Sannerholm, R (2007: 87). He advocates for a focus on legal, judicial and administrative reform in post-conflict 
states, including the control of corruption. He advised that law reform efforts focus only on human rights areas 
while ignoring basic issue of state organisation. 
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(WB)Anti-Corruption in Transition the Contribution to Policy Debate and the comprehensive 
papers on political corruption by the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre. 
This author also referred  to books and articles from academics, researchers and practitioners, 
who have written widely on the subjects of corruption and transitional justice, among others; 
Stephen Kotkin, András Sajó (political corruption in transition a sceptic‟s handbook)Peter 
Gastrow, Charles Goredema,  Annette Hubschle, Susan Rose Ackerman, Inge Amundsen, 
Robert Klirtgaard, and Mary Robin. However all these research does not exclusively delve 
upon the problem of political corruption in the SADC region. This research is aimed at filling 
this gap. 
1.6 Research Methodology 
The research paper is based on a desk-top study, which draws on primary materials and 
secondary sources. The primary materials will be mainly composed of international and 
regional declarations, treaties, conventions and protocols, national laws and policy documents 
of selected countries. The secondary sources will be mainly journal articles, books, chapters 
in books, media reports, and the publications of research institutes, aid agencies and non-
governmental organisations. 
The study will start with an analysis of the factors that make states in transition vulnerable to 
political corruption.  The subsequent chapter will discuss the most prevalent typologies of 
political corruption, as they manifest themselves in selected SADC countries. This will be 
followed by a critical examination of the negative impact of political corruption. In closing, 
the study will offer numerous recommendations to curb the challenges examined in the 
preceding chapter. 
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1.7 Delimitation of the Study 
Typologies of corruption offer useful points of departure.
7
The basic differentiations between 
different types of corruption provide a preliminary guidance for any inquiry into 
corruption.
8
For this reason, this paper shall be limited to the study of political corruption only 
because it is more linked to the phenomenon of political transitions which is the germane 
subject of this paper. 
Moreover, „types of corruption differ according to the nature of the political and economic 
regime‟.9 Therefore, this paper is limited to the study of political corruption insofar as it plays 
itself out during transitional periods in selected countries of the SADC region namely 
Swaziland, South Africa, Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  
Also, for the purposes of this study, the term „transition‟ shall be defined according to the 
definition associated with the concept of transitional justice, namely a emergence from 
conflict and/or state repression to a democratic polity. 
Further, this paper does not deal exhaustively with the types, causes, consequences of 
political corruption, nor does it pretend to hold all the solutions to curbing this kind of 
phenomenon in all the states undergoing transition.  
 
 
                                                 
7 Bailey, J „Corruption and Democratic Governability in Latin America: Issues of Types, Arenas, Perceptions, 
and Linkages‟ available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu /Security/ reference materials _bailey.pdf (accessed on 
13 July 2011). 
8Anders, G and Nuijten, M (eds.) (2007:6). 
9Anders, G and Nuijten, M (eds.) (2007:7). 
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1.8 Outline of the Study 
The remainder of this research paper is divided into four chapters. 
Chapter Two: Dynamics of Political Corruption in Transitional States of the SADC Region 
This section analyses specific types of political corruption common in transitional states, 
namely; bribery, trading in influence, patronage, electoral fraud, embezzlement and 
involvement in organised crime. 
Chapter Three: The Dynamics of Political Corruption in Transitional States 
This chapter gives an overview of some of the more glaring causes of political corruption 
during periods of transition. It focuses on the following factors; a vacuum in power, lack of 
social control mechanisms, connection between political power and access to economic 
resources, lack of resources within the law enforcement mechanisms, and unrestrained 
opportunism. 
This chapter examines the causes and conditions of political corruption in transitional states 
in the context of organised crime. It highlights why political corruption flourishes and spreads 
itself with impunity in those selected countries of the SADC region. 
Chapter Four: The Costs of Political Corruption in Transitional States 
This chapter discusses the effects of political corruption on transition states of the SADC 
region across a range of sectors. It points out how it subverts promising constitutional rights, 
rule of law, democracy, and legitimacy of the state and economic development. 
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Chapter Five: Concluding Remarks and Recommendations 
This chapter will summarise the paper and will set out some recommendations, flowing 
mainly from the discussion in Chapter Four, on what needs and could be done to deter 
political corruption following transitions in the SADC region. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN TRANSITIONAL STATES OF THE 
SADC REGION 
2.1 Definition 
What is political corruption? Is it prudent to pin this phrase down to a strict definition or 
rather, it is worthy to follow the advice of Marx Weber on defining corruption. According to 
him, a definition should be avoided at the beginning, however, it should be derived in the end 
by analysing specific examples which are not definitions in themselves, but can be tailored to 
suit the purpose at hand.
10
 
The literature on political corruption offers numerous definitions. However, definitions are 
dynamic. For instance, societies‟ understanding of what counts as corruption changes over 
time
11
. Thus, the text of United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) does not 
include a definition of corruption because States Parties agreed during the drafting stages that 
corruption is a changing concept that can mean different things to different people at any 
given time and is not capable of being given a fixed definition.
12
 
In order to understand the provinces of political corruption one needs to first understand the 
definition of corruption in general. For the purposes of this research we shall adopt the 
Weberian approach and analyse the definition of the law as it is written
13
.Therefore it is 
                                                 
10 Weber, M, Coe, M.D and Parsons, T (2003:5). 
11 Klirtgaard, R (1991:23). 
12Argandona, A (2006:7). 
13Klirtgaard, R (1991:23). 
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necessary to scrutinise the laws of a selected group of countries as well as the overarching 
regional instruments related to fighting corruption in the region. 
According to the Zimbabwean Prevention of Corruption Act,
14
 corruption is defined as 
consisting in: 
„[a]ny agent corruptly soliciting, accepting, obtaining, agreeing to accept, or attempt 
to obtain from any person a gift or consideration for himself or any other consideration for 
himself or any other persons  as endowment or reward for doing or not doing for having done 
or not done any act, in relation to his or her principals affairs or business.‟ 
The Malawian Corrupt Practices Act
15
defines corrupt practice as: 
a)  the offering, giving, receiving, obtaining or soliciting of any advantage to 
influence the action of any public officer or any official or any other person in the discharge 
of the duties of that public officer, of official or other person; 
b)  influence peddling; 
c)  the extortion of any advantage. 
In Mozambique, corruption is defined negatively by Article 6 of the Anti-Corruption 
Contractual Clause
16
 as follows: 
„Parties undertake not to offer, whether directly or indirectly, benefits to third parties 
nor request, promise or accept, for their own benefit or the benefit of others, offers for 
purposes of obtaining a favourable decision in respect of the services to be offered.‟ 
                                                 
14Prevention of Corruption Act, No, 15 of 1994. 
15 Corrupt Practices Act, No. 18 of 1995. 
16 Anti-Corruption Contractual Clause Law, No. 6 of 2004. 
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The Southern Africa Development Community Protocol against Corruption (SADC Protocol 
against Corruption)
17
defines corruption as any act which: 
„[I]ncludes bribery or any other behaviour in relation to persons entrusted with 
responsibilities in the public and private sectors which violates their duties as public officials, 
private employees, independent agents or other relationships of that kind and aimed at 
obtaining undue advantage of any kind for themselves or others.‟ 
A general trend can be deduced from these definitions, which defines political corruption 
where; 
„A public official (A), 
In violation of the trust placed in him/her by the public (B), 
And in a manner that harms the public interest, 
Knowingly engages in conduct which exploits the office for clear personal and private gain in 
a way which runs contrary to the accepted rules and standards for the conduct of public office 
within the political culture, 
So as to benefit a third party (C) by providing (C) with access to goods or service (C) would 
not otherwise obtain.‟18 
The other definition of political corruption is made with reference to the personnel involved, 
namely senior politicians, and the purpose of the corrupt behaviour, namely to sustain the 
                                                 
17SADC Protocol against Corruption adopted on 14 August 2001 and came into force on 6 July 2005, available 
at http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/122 (accessed on 13 August 2011). 
18Philip, M (2002:42). 
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hold on power.
19
 Robin Hodess offers a concise definition of political corruption as „the 
abuse of entrusted power by political leaders for private gain, with the objective of increasing 
power or wealth‟.20 This is the kind of corruption that plagues transitional states, such as the 
ones comprising the SADC region. 
2.2 Types of Political Corruption Prevalent in Transitional States in the SADC 
Region 
2.2.1 Bribery 
According to the Black‟s Law Dictionary a bribe is the „offering, giving, receiving, or 
soliciting of any item of value (my emphasis) to influence the actions of an official or other 
person in charge of a public or legal duty‟.21 The other terms for bribery are kickbacks, 
baksheesh, sweeteners, grease money and pay-offs, which all include forms of payments 
which are made to make things happen quicker, smoother or more favourably through a 
bureaucracy, or to avoid some impediment.
22
The most infamous type of a bribe is a kickback 
which is defined as amount of money paid each time by a contractor when it received some 
work or payment through corrupt means.
23
 
                                                 
19U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre „Political Corruption‟ available at http://www.u4.no/themes/political-
corruption/introduction.cfm (accessed on 13 July 2011). 
20Hodess, R (2004:11). 
21(2001).  
22Amundsen, I (1999:11). 
23U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre „Potential Scheme: Bribes and Kickbacks‟ available at   
http://www.u4.no/themes/corruption-aid/red-flag-tool/Bribes%20and%20kickbacks.cfm (accessed on 12 July 
2011). 
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The South African case of S v Zuma and Others
24
 can effectively illustrate the problem of 
bribery in transitional states. In this case, known as the arms deal scandal, Jacob Zuma, when 
he was South Africa‟s deputy president, was charged with allegations of allegedly attempting 
to solicit a bribe from the head of the German arms manufacturing company trading in South 
Africa, Thomson, in return for protecting the company from being investigated. However, the 
case ended when the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) who heads up the 
country‟s National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) announced that Zuma would not be charged 
despite there being a valid case against him because the State was not sure of its chances of 
success in court. This was despite, the fact that the charges against Zama‟s financial advisor 
Schabir Shaik, have spelled out sufficient evidence linking Zuma to the bribe, such as the 
amount of money and other benefits he allegedly received.
25
 
It is worthy to note that the charges against Zuma were dismissed two weeks before the 
presidential elections in which Zuma was the ANC party candidate. When Zuma appeared in 
court, Judge Chris Nicholson ruled that the corruption charges were brought outside the 
provisions of the Constitution and were therefore unlawful because the NDPP did not follow 
the procedure in the South African Constitution to give Zuma a chance to make 
representations before deciding to charge him.
26
 Because of that, the Court ruled that the 
NDPP's violation of the procedure which is prescribed in South African Constitution 
rendered the charges against Zuma illegal. The Court held further that the NDPP‟s decision to 
bring the charges Zuma immediately after his appointment as his party‟s president could 
possibly lead one to conclude that there was some political interference in this case from the 
                                                 
24(CC) 358/08 [2006]. 
25S v Shaik 2007 (1) SACR 142 (D), S v Shaik 2007 (1) SA 240. 
26African Reuters (9 February 2009) available at, http://af.reuters.com/  (accessed on 16 September 2011). 
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other branches of the state.
27
However, the judge also emphasised that whether Zuma was 
guilty or innocent was not determined by his ruling, which was merely on a procedural point. 
Consequent to this judgement, the NDPP was still eligible to file fresh charges against Zuma, 
once they had complied with the provisions of the Constitution. 
2.2.2 Embezzlement 
Another typology of political corruption that is rampant in transitional states is 
embezzlement. It is defined as theft of public resources by public officials.
28
Therefore, 
embezzlement cannot be defined as corruption from a strict legal view in many domestic and 
international definitions of corruption.
29
 This is because there is a common recognition that 
corruption is a transaction between two actors, the public servant and the citizen or company 
from the other side.
30
But for this common theft to fall into the context of corruption, few 
conditions must exist, namely: the official must take or convert public money, or property , 
which he or she is not entitled to, but has access to such assets.
31
 
A country in transition faces economic and political changes. According to research by an 
economist, the rational choice theory explains embezzlement as a legitimate means during 
periods of transition.
32
According to Banerjee this theory is based on the premises that 
individuals pursue goals, interests and choose actions that can satisfy their own welfare more 
                                                 
27African Reuters (9 February 2009) available at, http://af.reuters.com/  (accessed on 16 September 2011). 
28 Amundsen, I (1999:7). 
29Langseth, P (2006:10). 
30 Dvorak, J „Researching Embezzlement in Public Sector: Limits and Possibilities‟SSRN14 November 2008 2 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1636206 (accessed on 15 July 2011). 
31 Dvorak, J „Researching Embezzlement in Public Sector: Limits and Possibilities‟ SSRN 14 November 2008 2 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1636206 (accessed on 15 July 2011). 
32 Banerjee, A (1997:31). 
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efficiently than any collective goals.
33
Dvorak, using the example of how the collapse of 
Soviet Union provided opportunities for embezzlers to introduce their illegal behaviour as 
fighting against the communist regime notes that for states in transition embezzlement will 
become a habit and stealing from the government is a norm.
34
 
From the prevalence of cases involving embezzlement it can be deduced that those SADC 
countries in transition are no special exception to this behaviour. 
The case of Attorney General of Zambia for and on behalf of the Republic of Zambia 
(Claimant) –and-Meer Care & Desai (a firm) &Ors,35 a civil case brought by the Attorney 
General of Zambia for and on behalf of the people of Zambia against the former president of 
Zambia, Fredrick Chiluba and other members of his government before the Chancery 
Division of the England and Wales High Court, can support this assentation. 
The brief facts of the case are as follows: Zambia was in transition after 31 years as a one-
party state when Chiluba came to power in 1991. During his 10-year rule he allegedly 
embezzled at least US$46 million with the aid of the Zambian Security Intelligence Service 
(ZSIS).
36
 The embezzlement scheme was a transnational one, straddling South Africa, the 
United Kingdom, Belgium and Switzerland. The civil case is threefold: The first part 
involves the transfer of at least $52,000,000 made by Zambia to Zamtrop a secret bank 
account held at the London based Zambia National Commercial Bank Limited (ZANACO), 
referred to as the "Zamtrop Conspiracy". The second cases concerns a property of a company 
                                                 
33Banerjee, A (1997: 31). 
34Dvorak, J „Researching Embezzlement in Public Sector: Limits and Possibilities‟ (SSRN 14 November 2008) 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1636206 (accessed on 15 July 2011). 
35[2007] EWC 952 2 (CH). 
36 See Republic of Zambia v. Meer Care & Desai [2007] EWC 952 2 (CH). 
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registered in the UK called MOFED Ltd which is owned by the Government of Zambia, 
known as the "MOFED Claim".  The third case deals with payments of about $20,000,000 
allegedly made by Zambia to Bulgaria for arms deals paid into accounts in Belgium and  
Switzerland involving London, the " BK Conspiracy".
37
 
The court proceedings took place privately on the order of the trial judge to avoid prejudicing 
another trial in Zambia that was underway where Chiluba and his accomplices were facing 
criminal charges relating to the same matter. According to the civil case, the most telling 
evidence was the US$1,2 million worth of boutique clothing that Chiluba, who earned 
US$105000 between 1991 and 2001 when he was President, bought in Switzerland to 
maintain his reputation as a „smart and expensive dresser‟, a reputation for which he was 
known worldwide. His own stylish suits were monogrammed with his initials and he boasted 
a large number of specially-made signature shoes and thousands of monogrammed shirts. 
Chiluba was found guilty of embezzling $46m of public money by the England and Wales 
High Court. 
2.2.3 Trading in Influence 
Trading in influence or influence peddling is a form of corruption common in transitional 
countries: „Trading in influence constitutes a corrupt trilateral relationship in which a person 
with real or supposed influence on other persons, often public officials, trades this influence 
against money with someone seeking influence.‟38 
                                                 
37Basel Institute on Governance, International Centre for Assert Recovery Knowledge Centre, available at, 
http://www.assetrecovery.org/kc/node/4ec2e572-cd77-11dc-b471-db7db47931e5 (accessed on 16 September 
2011). 
38Council of Europe (1998:10). 
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It is sometimes problematic to differentiate this form of political corruption from lobbying. 
By and large, both are ways of getting assistance from the state officials through exchanging 
some form of favours.
39
 
Trading in influence has been identified as a potential problem for the SADC countries in 
transition.
40
Consequently, the SADC Protocol against corruption, which seeks to curb all 
traits and forms of corruption that are thriving in the region, has proscribed trading in 
influence. The SADC Protocol against Corruption provides that: 
„the offering, giving, solicitation or acceptance directly or indirectly, or promising of 
any undue advantage to or by any person who asserts or confirms that he or she is able to 
exert any improper influence over the decision making of any person performing functions in 
the public or private sector in consideration thereof, whether the undue advantage is for 
himself or herself or for anyone else, as well as the request, receipt or the acceptance of the 
offer or the promise of such an advantage, in consideration of the influence, whether or not 
the influence is exerted or whether or not the supposed influence leads to the intended 
result.‟41 
In Mozambique, top politicians often trade in influence. Senior political figures, mainly 
veterans of the anti-colonial liberation war, use their influential positions to corrupt judicial 
officials and other individuals capable of acting against corruption and organised crime.
42
 
                                                 
39Campos, N and Giovannoni, F (2006:1). 
40Ramachandran, V, Shah, M.K and Tata, G „How Does Influence-Peddling Impact Industrial Competition? 
Evidence from Enterprise Surveys in Africa‟ SSRN (October 1 2007) available 
athttp://ssrn.com/abstract=1101694(accessed on 18 July 2011). 
41SADC Protocol against Corruption, Article 3(1) (f). 
42 Gastrow, P and Mosse, M „Mozambique: Threats posed by the penetration of criminal networks‟ (19 April 
2002 19) available at www.metier.co.mz/b/pv_mosse_crime_corruption_moz.pdf(accessed on 20 July 2011). 
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2.2.4 Patronage 
Another special form of political corruption that arises during transition to democracy is 
patronage. A patronage system of governance is exemplified by the appointment of party 
loyalist to senior positions in the government.
43
This can pose a dilemma for states in 
transition in which preference should be given to those individuals who demonstrated 
commitment to the ideals of democracy.
44
Patronage can be legitimate, for example, when a 
newly, elected government changes the top officials of the erstwhile regime in order to ensure 
that its policies are implemented promptly. But it would be a sign of corruption if 
incompetent party officials are preferred above qualified persons for deployment in the public 
service in thankfulness for supporting the governing political party.
45
 
Zimbabwe is a case in point as regards the latter. After independence from Britain, the 
number of public servants increased from 40 000 in 1979 to 189 000 in 1992.
46
 Most of these 
jobs were filled by party loyalists with no credible qualifications for the job. More recently 
appointments to key positions in the government, parastatals and diplomatic services have 
been reserved for those who are loyal to President Mugabe or the Zimbabwe African 
Nationalist Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU (PF)) party.
47
Parastatals have been converted 
from being production and marketing mechanisms into sites of political patronage as ZANU 
PF appointments to the respective boards were based on a system of patronage. For example, 
in 2005 state owned enterprises were forced to erect stands and pay rentals at the ZANU PF 
                                                 
43Kunaka, C, Mashumba, N and Matsheza, P (2002:13). 
44Kritz, N (1995:6).  
45Gyimah-Boadi, E „Election Corruption‟ (27 April 2004) available at 
www.cddghana.org/documents/Election%20Corruption.pdf – (accessed on 22 July 2011). 
46Tangri, R.K (1999:151). 
47Kunaka, C, Mashumba, N and Matsheza, P (2002:14). 
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congress, thereby contributing to the cost of the event and maintaining ZANU PF‟s grip on 
power.
48
 Also, whereas in most democracies cabinet reshuffles are meant to improve 
efficiency, thus enhancing the government‟s chances of achieving its policy, in Zimbabwe 
reshuffles have been used to award those who are loyal to the president and instrumental to 
maintaining the presidential grip on power in Zimbabwe.
49
 
Patronage is a double-edged knife when it comes to corruption in transitional societies. It is 
itself a form of corruption and it also harbours and breeds other forms of corruption. For 
instance, when such loyal persons are accused of corruption, the government‟s stalwarts 
immediately defend their patronage, accusing those calling for accountability as sell-outs, 
racists, diversionists and non-patriotic.
50
 
2.2.5 Election Corruption 
Another form of political corruption omnipresent in transitional states of the SADC region is 
election corruption. According to a Ghanaian academic, Emmanuel Boadi, election 
corruption falls under the category of political corruption and therefore it is a special type of 
corruption.
51
 He argues that political corruption in the form of electoral corruption is a 
common feature of politics and elections in both established and  nascent democracies.
52
 
Election corruption varies widely in both scope and extensiveness, from Sunday school 
elections to national presidential elections, the locus classicus being the Liberian 1927 
                                                 
48Kunaka, C, Mashumba, N and Matsheza, P (2002:14). 
49Tangri, R.K (1999:151). 
50Kunaka, C, Mashumba, N and Matsheza, P (2002:13). 
51Gyimah-Boadi, E „Election Corruption‟ (27 April 2004) available at 
www.cddghana.org/documents/Election%20Corruption.pdf – (accessed on 22 July 2011). 
52Gyimah-Boadi, E „Election Corruption‟ (27 April 2004) available at 
www.cddghana.org/documents/Election%20Corruption.pdf – (accessed on 22 July 2011). 
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Presidential elections in which the True Whig Party (TWP) and the incumbent President, 
Charles King, used state coercive machinery, forcing citizens to vote for King.
53
 Election 
officials also allowed the TWP members to vote repeatedly, a fact evidenced by King 
winning the election by a wide margin of 240 000 votes, whereas only 15 000 Liberians were 
entitled to vote. These elections went down in the Guinness Book of World Records (1982) 
as the most fraudulent elections in history.
54
 
Election corruption is twofold. It involves both private entities and individuals, the latter 
being the subject of discussion here. The fact is that the incumbent ruling party and its 
officials use finances or administrative resources to guarantee election victory, or use other 
government or public resources for political party purposes.
55
 
Similar to the other forms of political corruption, the concept of electoral corruption 
embraces a range of practices, some that are illegal and others not.
56
According to Gyimah-
Boadi common manifestations of election corruption are the following: 
 Holding political rallies in a government or public facility for free, and denying the 
same facilities to other political parties and candidates; 
 Barring other parties and candidates from access to state, public or tax payer- funded 
resources such as media, conference halls, public grounds, and other public places to 
disseminate their political message; 
                                                 
53McWhirter, N (1982:135). 
54McWhirter, N (1982:135). 
55Gyimah-Boadi, E „Election Corruption‟ (27 April 2004) available at www.cddghana .org/documents 
/Election%20 Corruption.pdf – (accessed on 22 July 2011). 
56Lodge, T (1999:1). 
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 Using civil servants to work for political parties at rallies and party offices during 
working days or working hours or even to staff party affiliated organisations, 
 Using state vehicles, and other public-funded facilities to carry political party 
supporters to political rallies, polling stations or to transport party materials; 
 Compromising the political neutrality of the security agencies; and 
 Election officials showing a lack of equity and vigour in adjudicating elections 
disputes amongst parties or pursuing allegations of election irregularities made by 
opposing parties.
57
 
 Studies on electoral corruption have shown that election manipulation in transitional 
states is carried out even when a landslide victory is certain, in order to influence 
expectations and subsequent patterns of political participation.
58
For example, it can 
discourage opponents from joining or supporting opposition parties, voting for them, 
or any other participation.
59
 
The South African experience can offer a valid example of election corruption during periods 
of transition. A political scientist, Lodge, notes that the 1994 elections, which marked the 
beginning of a transition, revealed serious incidences of electoral corruption, such as ballot 
staffing  that was carried out  through illegal polling stations in the province of Kwa Zulu 
Natal and other parts of the country.
60
Similarly, other media reports of election fraud during 
this election were reported elsewhere in newspapers ranging from South Africa‟s daily The 
                                                 
57Gyimah-Boadi, E „Election Corruption‟ (27 April 2004) available at 
www.cddghana.org/documents/Election%20Corruption.pdf – (accessed on 22 July 2011). 
58Gyimah-Boadi, E „Election Corruption‟ (27 April 2004) available at 
www.cddghana.org/documents/Election%20Corruption.pdf – (accessed on 22 July 2011). 
59Gyimah-Boadi, E „Election Corruption‟ (27 April 2004) available at www.cddghana.org /documents/ 
Election%20 Corruption.pdf – (accessed on 22 July 2011). 
60 Lodge, T (1999:2). 
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Argus to the London Sunday Times.
61
 These reports lead cynics to argue that the elections 
were tainted by election fraud and that the results which were announced came as a result of 
some negotiations, hence the following statement: 
„The 1994 election was so chaotic that no accurate result could be computed. Hence, 
its final outcome was essentially the product of negotiation. The ANC was accorded 63% of 
the vote, but this might well have exaggerated its true support. Opposition parties initially 
wanted to challenge the election result, but in the end they chose rather to accept it. For to 
question the outcome or demand a re-run of the poll was to risk throwing the country into the 
vortex of the people‟s war once more – and few people had the stomach for that. Most South 
Africans preferred to take comfort in the notion of a miracle transition and to hope that this 
would bring about the bright new future the ANC had long been promising.‟62 
Whether this statement is true or not, what it does do is to illustrate the problem that election 
corruption may pose in states in transition.  
Some scholars even argue that election corruption cannot be avoided in transitional 
democracies due to the fact that winning an election in a democracy is expensive, as elections 
and party financing will become increasingly subject to restrictive rules, and the demand for 
more campaign spending is high compared to that in autocratic states, thus making election 
corruption inevitable.
63
 
                                                 
61 See in general „Fraud, Failure and Farce: An Analysis of South Africa‟s Election 94‟ available 
athttp://www.christianaction.org.za/newsletter_uca/uca-artic_fraud_freedom_farce.htm(accessed on 12 July 
2011). 
62South African institute of Race Relations, available at, http://www.sairr.org.za/sairr-today/news_item.2009-
09-03.4310602162 (accessed on 13 July 2011). 
63Kotkin, S and Sajo, A (2002:12). 
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2.2.6 State involvement in organised crime 
Organised crime is still a new concept in Southern Africa. 
64
For easy reference, this paper 
will use the term „organised crime‟ as defined by a pioneer South African writer in this field, 
who defines it as follows: 
„Organised crime consists of those serious criminal offences committed by a criminal 
organisation, which is based on a structured association of more than two persons acting in 
concert over a prolonged period of time in pursuit of both their criminal objectives and 
profits.‟65 
Defined thus, acts according to this definition, which are prevalent in transitional states in the 
region, include inter alia; smuggling, illegal importation of goods, drug markets, dealing in 
protected species or rare resources, economic crimes and money laundering. The involvement 
of the state in organised crime differs from country to country and also in relation to the 
stages in the transitional period. However, the case of Mozambique offers a unique example 
of state involvement in organised crime in the SADC region. 
In Mozambique, there is a common perception within academic circles that the state is 
involved in criminal activities.
66
 This has been discussed even in public discourses. Mia 
Coute, a popular Mozambican writer, commented that Mozambique has become a corrupt 
country akin to kingdom which is ruled by criminals.
67
Antonia Soute, a well-known 
Mozambican economist, added that generally all the arms of the states in Mozambique are 
                                                 
64Hubschle, A (2010:7). 
65 Gastrow, P (2001:28). 
66 Gastrow, P and Mosse, M „Mozambique: Threats posed by the penetration of criminal networks‟ (19 April 
2002 19) available at www.metier.co.mz/b/pv_mosse_crime_corruption_moz.pdf(accessed on 20 July 2011). 
67Metical, Maputo, September 2001. 
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inefficient and have been captured by the Mafia which is now running the state.
68
 This 
represents a more widely held notion among the general public that their country is linked to 
organised crime.
69
 
The rationale for such a view that Mozambique is a criminal state is the easiness with which 
organised criminal networks have managed to manipulate both the state and private business 
structures.
70
A classic example is the theft of US$14 million from the Central Bank of 
Mozambique, the murder of Carlos Cardoso, an investigative journalist, who was killed 
following his reports on corruption and organised crime, and the lackadaisical response by 
the state security in investigating these cases. Thus authors Gastrow and Mosse concluded 
that empirical studies clearly show that Mozambique is coming close to becoming a criminal 
state. 
2.3 Conclusion 
Political corruption is not easy to define. However, the definition by Robin Hodess which 
defines it with reference to the personnel involved, namely senior politicians, and the aim of 
the corrupt behaviour, namely to withstand the hold on power can be used to describe 
political corruption in transitional states of the SADC region. In the SADC region political 
corruption manifests itself in the following typologies: bribery; embezzlement; trading in 
influence and the State‟s involvement in organised crime. 
 
                                                 
68Souto, A Metical, Maputo, 2 January 2001. 
69 Gastrow, P and Mosse, M „Mozambique: Threats posed by the penetration of criminal networks‟ (19 April 
2002 19) available at www.metier.co.mz/b/pv_mosse_crime_corruption_moz.pdf(accessed on 20 July 2011). 
70 Gastrow, P and Mosse, M „Mozambique: Threats posed by the penetration of criminal networks‟ (19 April 
2002 19) available at www.metier.co.mz/b/pv_mosse_crime_corruption_moz.pdf(accessed on 20 July 2011). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE CAUSES AND CONDITIONS OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN 
TRANSITIONAL STATES 
3.1 Introduction 
What are the circumstances, developments and characteristics peculiar to transitional states 
within the SADC region that make them vulnerable to political corruption? It is certain that 
political corruption might have been in existence in these countries long before 
transition.
71
Hence, it is not possible to outline definitive evidence that transition causes 
corruption, but it is clear that the political and economic reforms that are associated with the 
process of transition can exacerbate the opportunities for political corruption in these 
emerging democracies.
72
 
Accordingly, there is a growing body of literature on the causes of political corruption, 
ranging from variables such as, political instability, voting turn-out, state formations, 
inequality, number of women participation in public life,
73
 and some even argue that the more 
officials there are, the more the potential for political corruption.
74
However, some suggest 
                                                 
71World Bank „Political Corruption in Transition: A Contribution to Policy Debate‟ available 
atinfo.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/17506/contribution.pdf (accessed on 26 July 2011). 
72World Bank „Political Corruption in Transition: A Contribution to Policy Debate‟ available 
atinfo.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/17506/contribution.pdf (accessed on 26 July 2011). 
73 Dollar, D, Fisman R, and Gatti, R (2001:423). 
74Treisman, D (2000:404). 
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that even this list is not exhaustive, but just serves the purpose of illustrating many 
explanations proposed. 
75
 
The literature cited above illustrates that the causes of political corruption can be discussed 
from different points of view. However, there is no consensus on the factors that cause 
corruption because this depends on the choice of the analytical module or framework 
employed.
76
 Corruption can be analysed using different methods and borrowing from a 
variety of disciplines.
77
Therefore, it has been argued that, the choice of the analytical 
framework used to analyse corruption determines the view of the causes of corruption.
78
 
For the present purposes, political corruption is analysed through the prism of organised 
crime. There is little evidence and statistical results available focusing on the relationship 
between corruption and organised crime, however, most researchers point out the symbiotic 
relationship of these concepts.
79
Hence, the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organised Crime (UNCTOC), which is specifically designed to combat organised crime, 
contains numerous provisions pertinent to the fight against corruption. In particular, the 
convention dwells on the criminalisation of political corruption.
80
 
 
                                                 
75Singh, G „How to Weed Out Corruption at Personal Level, and 'Research' Studies‟ (April 19 2011) 
availableathttp://www.speakingtree.in/public/ao6msdk0v6d2lfbaemja8g8u/blog/How-to-Weed-Out-
CorruptionIV-Personal-Levels-Research (accessed on 28 July 2011). 
76 Collins, N and Oshea, M (2000:86). 
77Ampratwum, E.F (2008:78). 
78 Institute for Security Studies „Causes and Conditions for Corruption‟ available at 
http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No65/Chap4.html(accessed on 22 July 2011). 
79U4 Anti Corruption Resources Centre „Organised Crime and Corruption‟ available at (28 May 2008) 
http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/query.cfm?id=171 (accessed on 24 July 2011). 
80UNODC (2005) 3. 
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Goredema identified the factors peculiar to transitional states that create a vulnerability to 
organised crime as the following: occurrence of a power vacuum; diminished social control; 
close connection between political power and access to economic leverage; imbalance in 
resources between law enforcement structures and criminal organisations; and unbridled 
opportunism.
81
The following paragraphs expand on these factors as the causes and conditions 
for political corruption in transitional states of the SADC region. 
3.2 Occurrence of a Power Vacuum 
The dictionary defines a power vacuum as a condition that exists when someone has lost 
control of something and no one has replaced them.
82
 The authoritarian period characterised 
mainly, by „one-person rule, one-party rule and even military juntas‟ that preceded 
democratic transition of the SADC states might have created power vacuums.
83
 
Moreover, the power vacuum in the SADC region can be viewed as a by-product of 
colonialism through the tactful use of various mechanisms to induce African traditional 
leaders to cooperate with them in the quest of their colonial aim of governing and 
manipulating their own peoples.
84
This is against a background of decolonisation in the region 
that was primarily promoted by international forces, and most territories were not prepared to 
deal with good governance and corruption issues.
85
 Therefore, the practice of political 
                                                 
81Goredema, C (2003:36). 
82 Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary, available at http://dictionary .cambridge.org/ dictionary/ 
british/power-vacuum (accessed on 22 July 2011). 
83Matlosa, K (2007:5). 
84Mulinge, M and Lesetedi, G (1998:17). 
85 In Southern Africa, decolonisation can be classified in three stages: The first stage is the attainment of 
independence by SADC countries formerly colonised by Britain, which were known as the High Commission 
territories, namely; Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland, and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland 
(Malawi). The second stage, is marked by the struggle for independence in the Mozambique and in Zimbabwe 
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corruption in the post-colonial SADC region is a mere extension of colonial policies and 
practices which have served to cement it.
86
 
This is because many changes take place in transitional states after regime change, and it may 
take time to develop new structures. This may create a power vacuum, and by corollary, 
conditions for political corruption.
87
 For example, political corruption that may emerge out of 
this power vacuum is created by lack of adequate law enforcement mechanisms because, for 
example, they resigned from working in the new government. 
On the other hand, the power vacuum created by the collapse of a previous regime during 
transition periods may be quickly replaced, in most cases by a new government practising 
widespread corruption.
88
 Thus, despite getting political independence, most of the countries 
in transition have been labelled as suffering from colonisation by corruption, which has been 
facilitated by transnational forces.
89
The point is most clearly illustrated by the case of 
Malawi‟s transition from the autocratic rule of Banda and the corruption case of R v Bakili 
Muluzi & Another.
90
 
Malawi experienced one of the most autocratic regimes in Africa.
91
The Southern African 
country witnessed a relentless centralization of power under the autocratic rule of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
in which gained independence in 1980; and, third, the liberation of Namibia in 1990 and of South Africa, which 
secures majority following elections in 1994. See Britannica Online „Independence and Decolonisation of 
Southern Africa‟ available athttp://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/556618/Southern-
Africa/43825/Independence-and-decolonization-in-Southern-Africa (accessed on 1 August 2011). 
86Mulinge, M and Lesetedi, G (1998:17). 
87 Parliamentary Centre (2000:15). 
88 Parliamentary Centre (2000:15). 
89 Parliamentary Centre (2000:24). 
90 (1 of 2009) [2009] MWHC 18 (8 July 2009). 
91Meinhardt, H and Patel, N (2003:3). 
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country‟s first President, Hastings Kamuzu Banda and his Malawi Congress Party 
(MCP).
92
He transformed his status from Prime Minister to President for life, placing himself 
at the top of extensive party machinery. He crushed and outlawed political opposition and put 
himself in control of every state institution in the country.
93
 
However, despite this undemocratic set up, political corruption was not rampant during 
Banda‟s rule. Banda himself used to say on political corruption within his government that 
his „main business‟ was to create an honest, efficient, stable government and incorruptible 
administration that will allow foreign investors to get a licence without paying bribes to 
government officials.
94
 
This was not a mere political publicity stunt. Those who worked directly with Banda assert 
that he was „not personally corrupt‟. Officials working for the state or the MCP who were 
accused of theft were dealt with swiftly under Banda‟s rule and this resulted in a civil service 
that was relatively honest, hardworking and professional.
95
 
                                                 
92 „The MCP was efficiently structured from top down to the community level and was present in every single 
village in Malawi as a semi-state institution. It relied on a special police branch of the police, which had 
received training from the Mossad, an Israeli secret service and was backed by the Malawi Young Pioneers 
MYP a paramilitary movement, and a politically compromised police force to keep the society under check. 
Any comments and criticisms about the MCP, the state or Banda‟s policies was a serious crime. The youth 
league the MCP was responsible for ensuring that all Malawians renewed their annual party membership. As 
there are no ID-cards in Malawi, the MCP political party card became a de facto identity card for Malawians, for 
instance it was required to buy goods at the market, to use public transport and even to acquire medical services. 
See, Meinhardt H and Patel N (2003:4). 
93Cammack, D and Kelsall, T „Neo-patrimonialism, Institutions and Economic Growth: The Case of Malawi‟ 
IDS Bulletin (4 March 2011) available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1759-
5436.2011.00214.x/abstract (accessed on 2 August 2011). 
94Baker, C (2001:162). 
95 Anders, G„Like Chameleons: Civil Servants and Corruption in Malawi‟ available at 
http://apad.revues.org/137 (accessed on 2 August 2011). 
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The democratic transition that followed the end of Banda‟s autocratic regime set new 
parameters for managing political competition. Bakili Muluzi won the 1994 presidential 
election, the country's first multiparty election, defeating Banda. Whereas Banda had control 
of parliament and the selection of members of parliament (MP), Muluzi had to contend with 
opposition parties, multi-party elections, a minority government and coalition forming, and 
rowdy MPs who could possibly leave and join other parties.
96
 To retain support, the President 
ended up using the state resources and he often appointed people loyal to him even though 
unqualified for the job to run the state owned companies,   for instance, he increased the size 
of his cabinet to include more allies, and oversaw the siphoning of funds from government 
coffers by senior party people for political and personal ends.
97
Corruption spiralled out of 
control. 
Political corruption in Malawi degenerated to a scale previously unseen. This is reflected by 
numerous corruption reports involving senior politicians that were submitted to the anti-
corruption board, media and which were sometimes tried in the courts. For example, 
Chilumpha, Malawi‟s vice-president was allegedly involved in corruption, however the case 
remain unresolved. Friday Jumbe, former head of the Agriculture Development and 
Marketing Corporation was involved in a maize scam which cost the country MK2.9 billion. 
He was later appointed as Finance Minister; Former Attorney General, Peter Fatch, allegedly 
took part in the Land Rover Scam award of a contract to supply 110 Land Rover vehicles to 
government.
98
Bakili Muluzi was accused and charged with siphoning US$12 million from 
international donors to his personal accounts, however, the state prosecutors dropped the 
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charges against him following the suspension of the country's top anti-corruption official on 
the basis that there was no one competent to investigate the case.
99
 
3.3 Diminished Social Control 
Social control mechanisms can be defined as: 
„[T]hose organized responses to crime, delinquency and allied forms of deviant and/or 
socially problematic behaviour which are actually conceived of as such, whether in the 
reactive sense (after the putative act has taken place or the actor been identified) or in the 
proactive sense (to prevent the act).”100 
In the context of anti-corruption, social control mechanisms include inter alia; anti-corruption 
steering committees, operational watchdogs working inside state departments, committees 
made up of members of the civic society and government officials.
101
These social control 
mechanisms play a fundamental role in the vulnerability of a country to political corruption. 
On the other hand, transitions if handled badly may also have adverse impacts on the social 
controls in any society in which, for instance, it may lead to the weakening of these 
mechanisms.
102
 It follows logically that the lack of social and internal control mechanisms 
that are associated with transitional periods, people in power are more likely to be involved in 
                                                 
99APANC „State Drops Charges against Muluzi‟ available at 
thttp://www.apnacafrica.org/malawimuluzicharges_droped_e.htm (accessed on 3 August 2011). 
100 Cohen, S (1985:3). 
101UNODCCP (2001:55). 
102 Shaw, M (2002:2). 
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political corruption.
103
This can take different forms such as embezzlement of funds, bribery, 
patronage, electoral corruption and involvement of the state in organized crime. 
Post-conflict Mozambique illustrates this point very well.
104
In Mozambique, for example, as 
a result of political transition, most of the social control mechanisms that were put in place 
under the socialist rule of Samora Machel, which included mechanisms that allowed citizens 
to participate in political discussions  that affect them daily, such as determining methods to 
hold politicians accountable in carrying out their public functions, were abrogated and 
substituted by dubious government structures which were mere window dressing measures to 
a country failed by its politicians.
105
Following such retreat in social control mechanisms, 
political corruption soared out of control. 
                                                 
103Klirtgaard, R „The Future of Corruption‟ available athttp://www.transparentnizakazky.cz/novinky/130-the-
future-of-corruption-by-prof-robert-klitgaard-(accessed on 3 August 2011). 
104Since the 1980s, the political transition in Mozambique can be divided into five stages; the fifth one is still 
on-going.  The first stage started in 1983 and ended in1985 with the adoption of theNkomati non-aggression 
agreement between Mozambique‟s political party RENAMO and South Africa to end the war.The second stage 
was marked by a military crisis between the government of Mozambique and RENAMO rebels in 1987. 
President Joaquim Chissano curved in to the pressure by the Mozambican civic society, which was calling for 
the government to make peaceful talks with RENAMO. The third stage begins in the 1990s and was brokered by 
Sant' Egidio Catholic lay community in Rome which facilitated some talks between the FRELIMO government 
and RENAMO to resolve the conflict amicably which culminated in the adoption of the General Peace 
Agreement (GPA)on 4 October 1992 in Rome. This stage can be considered as the landmark period in the 
transition process, it happened in juxtaposition with the political transition in South Africa, a critical dry spell in 
the whole of the Southern Africa region, and the demise of the Cold War. The fourth stage is the implementation 
of the GPA, monitored by the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), which concluded with the 
plural party elections in October 1994. The final stage started in 1994 when the United Nations handed over to 
the Mozambique authorities, this is the consolidation of democracy phase of the peace process, and it still 
remains unstable. Armon, J, Hendrickson, D and Vines, A (1998).  
105 Gastrow, P and Mosse, M „Mozambique: Threats posed by the penetration of criminal networks‟ (19 April 
2002 19) available at www.metier.co.mz/b/pv_mosse_crime_corruption_moz.pdf (accessed on 20 July 2011). 
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Moreover, a drawback in social control mechanisms will result in distrust of the government 
by members of the public. Citizens will be less interested in exercising moral checks on their 
leaders because of the cynicism that nothing will happen and where cynicism reigns, apathy 
follows.
106
 It will become easier for citizens to accept that nothing can be done about an issue 
once they convince themselves that it does not matter. This behaviour allows political 
corruption to flourish in transitional states. 
3.4 Lack of resources within law enforcement structures 
According to Transparency International (TI), in the context of anti-corruption law, 
enforcement structures may include the following entities: 
 „An auditor general, acting as a watchdog over financial integrity and the credibility 
of reported information, 
 The attorney general, “acting as the chief law officer of the state guardian of the 
public interest”, 
 The public service, erecting a system designed to protect the public decision making 
process, 
 The rule of law, to adjudicate whether or not a particular action taken by, or on behalf 
of a state is in accordance with the law, 
 The judiciary which should be independent and informed it holds a central place in 
the realization of just, honest, open and accountable government, 
                                                 
106 Klirtgaard, R „The Future of Corruption‟ available at http://www.transparentnizakazky.cz/novinky/130-the-
future-of-corruption-by-prof-robert-klitgaard- (accessed on 3 August 2011). 
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 An ombudsman who acts to prevent corruption and maladministration; it can 
recommend improvements to procedures and practices and act as an incentive for 
public officials to keep their files in order, 
 Independent anti-corruption agencies “as the corrupt grow more sophisticated 
convential law enforcement agencies are becoming less able to detect and prosecute 
complex corruption cases”.‟107 
The above-mentioned law enforcement structures are crucial measures to curb political 
corruption. For instance, effective law enforcement can discourage corruption by breaking 
the cycle of impunity.
108
 However for these structures to perform effectively, they need to be 
adequately resourced. The lack of resources within the law enforcement structures of the state 
will create an opportunity for political corruption to prosper undetected. 
Law enforcement mechanisms in transitional states lack adequate resources and therefore, 
they are vulnerable to political corruption. The underlying assumption is that the more 
personnel and resources which are employed in law enforcement structures, the more 
effective will be the performance of the relevant agencies in fighting corruption.
109
 The 
effectiveness and efficient functioning of the criminal justice system will control corruption 
levels, since corruption is a crime involving the rational valuation of potential costs and 
                                                 
107 Transparency International The National Integrity System Concept and Practice(2001) 
108U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre „The Impact of Law Enforcement Interventions on Corruption‟ available 
at http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/query.cfm?id=215 (accessed on 6 August 2011). 
109Buscaglia, E and  Dijk, J „Controlling Organized Crime and Corruption in The Public Sector‟ available at 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/forum/forum3_Art1.pdf (accessed on 6 August 2011). 
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benefits by those who commit such acts. If chances of being caught are high, politicians will 
refrain from resorting to corruption and vice versa.
110
 
But according to research, only little empirical evidence is available to demonstrate that law 
enforcement can have long-term effects on the fight against corruption. 
111
 Moreover, 
according to research, certain conditions need to exist for specialised law enforcement 
structures to be able to work effectively as a tool against corruption namely: they need to be 
supported by dedicated government anti-corruption policies; they require a conducive legal 
background; a satisfactory government with adequate resources; and legitimacy. But most of 
these conditions are sometimes lacking in a transition state underpinning transition.
112
 
3.5 Close connection between political power and access to economic leverage 
Empirical evidence by practitioners revealed close connection between political power and 
access to economic leverage is a source of political corruption in transitional states.
113
By 
virtue of their position and the influence that they may hold, Politically Exposed Persons 
generally present a greater risk for potential involvement in political corruption in transitional 
states.
114
 
 
 
                                                 
110Buscaglia, E and Dijk, J „Controlling Organized Crime and Corruption in The Public Sector‟ available at 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/forum/forum3_Art1.pdf (accessed on 6 August 2011). 
111U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre „The Impact of Law Enforcement Interventions on Corruption‟ available 
at http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/query.cfm?id=215 (accessed on 6 August 2011). 
112U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre „The Impact of Law Enforcement Interventions on Corruption‟ available 
at http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/query.cfm?id=215 (accessed on 6 August 2011) 
113 Amundsen, I (1999:11). 
114 Carranza, R (2008:311). 
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Who are the politically exposed persons? 
The UNCAC defined Politically Exposed Persons as: 
„[a]ny person holding a legislative, executive, administrative or judicial office of a 
State Party, whether appointed or elected, whether permanent or temporary, whether paid or 
unpaid, irrespective of that person's seniority; (ii) any other person who performs a public 
function, including for a public agency or public enterprise, or provides a public service, as 
defined in the domestic law of the State Party and as applied in the pertinent area of law of 
that State Party; (iii) any other person defined as a “public official” in the domestic law of a 
State Party.‟115 
For the purposes of this research, the definition above will be used. 
In what ways do PEPs abuse their authority? 
This section will explain different methods that can be employed by PEPs to engage in 
political corruption for their personal enrichment or maintenance of political power. 
Traditionally, politicians were well known to pass legislation that will allow them to abuse 
office, in nascent democracies. It has become more and more difficult for legislators to pass 
laws with the aim to pursue a private agenda without constraints. However, because 
legislators have an upper control on the law-making process they may use that position to 
engage in corruption or may become susceptible to corruption by individuals whose interests 
may be affected by such laws.  
Moreover, there are many ways in which PEPs can be involved in political corruption. For 
example, PEPs may embezzle state resources when they steal from the government or when 
                                                 
115UNCAC, Article 2 (a). 
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they abuse their authority as the intermediaries in business and commercial activities by 
soliciting and accepting bribes. For instance, PEPs frequently use opportunities presented by 
bureaucratic decisions to solicit for bribes. In some cases, PEPs may become corrupt through 
controlling the amount of information accessible to the public or by even restricting such 
information. Finally, a politician may practice patronage by allocating public funds to a 
selected few, such as his supporters and indigenous people etc.
116
 
With regards to Southern Africa, an extract from the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) 
monogram edited by Gastrow gives an overview of the conditions that most SADC states 
encountered in the early stages of transitions. He observed: 
„Many recently independent states were then faced with the overwhelming task of 
managing a double transition, namely from state-led to market-led economies, and 
from autocratic rule to transparent democratic politics. With some exceptions, such as 
Botswana, the SAPs (structural adjustment programmes author‟s note) tended to 
produce unintended consequences. Besides being ineffective on a macro-economic 
level in many countries, there were elements in the political leadership and in 
bureaucracies who skilfully managed the reforms in a way to suit themselves. These 
elements were able to use the new ideological changes to engage in “practices of 
accumulation”, by staking out for themselves profitable areas for their own business 
activities. They straddled positions of public office with positions of accumulation, 
inevitably leading to corruption. This development was bound to impact on 
corruption.‟117 
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Therefore politicians were using their control on the economic leverage for private gain 
during the political and economic transformations. 
3.6 Unbridled Opportunism 
Political corruption in the SADC region can be attributed to unchecked opportunism, which 
in many cases may be a result of the following factors: democratisation; privatisation; unclear 
rules; and an influx of funds aid and foreign business. All these factors may lead PEPs to 
„strike while the iron is hot‟ during the transitional interlude. 
The democratisation process may provide new opportunities for political corruption in the 
region. The unexpected increase in the respect for human rights violations may lead to an 
epoch of governing without accountability, where the former victims of an autocratic state 
will confuse „the freedom from oppression with freedom from any authority and any 
responsibility‟. 118 Chang explained the rationale for political corruption in nascent 
democracies as being attributable to the need to introduce elections before laying out a 
structure for political accountability. He argues that this system will lead to political 
corruption in that those appointed in political offices will not be subject to any system of 
checks and balances.
119
 
Another main feature of transition is the enormous reallocation of the former state‟s property 
from government control into the private sector or privatisation.
120
This provides another 
source of opportunism during transitional periods. It is mainly this exercise of privatisation 
                                                 
118Amundsen, I (1999:18). 
119Ashiku, M (2011:112). 
120 World Bank „Political Corruption in Transition: A Contribution to Policy Debate‟ available at 
info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/17506/contribution.pdf (accessed on 26 July 2011). 
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that has been the main motivation for political corruption in transitional states.
121
 The 
inherent vulnerability of privatisation to political corruption has been attributed to the 
strategy by senior politicians overseeing the process who then become severely tempted to 
manipulate the rules to their advantages and also to enrich themselves economically during 
the course of economic transition.
122
 
Furthermore, anecdotal evidence has shown that countries in transition will experience a rise 
in cases of political corruption, for example, in the form of bribery demands mainly because 
government officials may exploit the unclear rules during periods of transition. This would 
enable corrupt officials to commit unscrupulous offences or find means to coerce funds from 
ordinary and ignorant civilians.
123
 Unclear rules may be a result of repeal of formerly 
draconian criminal legislation used by the erstwhile autocratic regime. 
Moreover, political corruption tends to increase in periods of transition because States 
coming from a period of conflict will normally have very weak institutions of accountability 
and an inflow of resources from outside.
124
These scenarios will most likely provide 
inducements for corrupt officials to engage in activities for their own enrichment. The major 
sources of funds are business investments and foreign aid. Senior politicians will be involved 
in negotiating business investments and at the same time have discretion as to the 
disbursements of foreign aid which they receive on behalf of the citizens. 
                                                 
121 World Bank „Political Corruption in Transition: A Contribution to Policy Debate‟ available at 
info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/17506/contribution.pdf (accessed on 26 July 2011). 
122 Reed, Q (2002:263). 
123Rose-Ackerman, S „Corruption and Post-Conflict Peace-Building’ (Draft for ONULR 4 January 2008) 
available at www.upenn.edu/provost/images/uploads/RoseAckerman.pdfSimilar (accessed on 27 July 2011). 
124Rose-Ackerman, S „Corruption and Post-Conflict Peace-Building’ (Draft for ONULR 4 January 2008) 
available at www.upenn.edu/provost/images/uploads/RoseAckerman.pdfSimilar (accessed on 27 July 2011). 
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3.7 Conclusion 
Many factors can lead to political corruption in transitional countries. In the case of the 
SADC region it can be concluded that the following factors have created an impetus for 
political corruption: the power vacuum that occurs following the loss of control by the 
repressive regime in its dying stages; plus, the absence of checks and balances that find 
resonance in the diminished social control mechanisms by the civilians; and the lack of 
resources within the State‟s law enforcement mechanisms. On the other hand, at the 
individual level, the close connection between access to economic and political leverage, in 
juxtaposition with unrestrained opportunism, influence politically exposed persons in 
transitional states to be prone to corruption. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE COST OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN TRANSITIONAL STATES 
4.1 Introduction 
The costs of political corruption are not only confined to transitional states. In fact, it has 
been noted that corruption is everywhere and that the incidence and type may vary in degree 
and in significance, but the effects are the same in every country, namely: it will tarnish the 
image of the State; damage the moral fabric of the society, diminish the ethical standards in 
governance; give rise to social instability and insecurity due the increased gulf between the 
rich and the poor; and in particular, it results in a heavy economic burden being placed on the 
poor and the weak.
125
 
Pioneering research on the effects of corruption in Africa has yielded two schools of 
thought.
126
 For convenience, the one view shall be called the „grease in the wheels‟ view and 
the other, the „sand the wheels „view.127The grease in the wheels hypothesis is mainly 
identified with writers such as Nathaniel Leff, Samuel Huntington and Colin Leys, to 
mention just a few.
128
The premise they put forward is that corruption may be beneficial 
because of the complications which may be a result of mismanagement in government 
institutions. Their main point is that an unproductive administration creates an obstruction to 
investments, a state of affairs that some „speed‟ or „grease‟ money may assist to by-pass. In 
                                                 
125Hassan, S (2004:25). 
126MukumMbaku, J (2007:87). 
127 Guillaume Méon, P and Sekkat, K (2005:122). 
128Leff,  N.H (1964:8), Huntington, S (1968:386), Leys, C (1965:3) respectively. 
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short, the grease the wheels theory postulates that corruption may act as a good mechanism, 
which facilitates efficacy, investments and consequently development.
129
 
The other school argues that corruption enhances inefficiency in the public services and 
generally has a negative effect on development as a whole.
130
One of the proponents of this 
theory, Cartier-Bresson, argues that the: 
 „[t]heoretical and empirical analyses of the causes and consequences of, as well as the 
means of fighting against, corruption has reached a certain level of maturity. The 
functionalist currents, which viewed corruption as a system that lubricates the cogs of the 
bureaucratic machine, have disappeared. Economists have reached a consensus on the very 
negative effects of the phenomenon.‟131 
According to the „sands the wheels‟ view, corruption is an impediment to development and it 
frustrates transitions to democracy.
132
 
4.2 Rule of Law  
O‟Donnell argues that if defined broadly, the rule of law and corruption are complementary 
topics because, for example, „the rule of law is founded on impersonal trust in laws and 
institutions and corruption has been associated with higher levels of “particularized trust” 
between individuals‟.133 
                                                 
129Anoruo, E and Braha, H (2005: 43). 
130MukumMbaku, J (2007:87). 
131Cartier-Bresson J „From the State of the Question to the Question of the State‟ available at 
http://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/Admin/Public/DWSDownload.aspx? (accessed on 19 September 2011). 
132Toke, S.A (2011:15). 
133 O‟Donnell, M „Post Conflict Corruption: A rule of Law Agenda?‟ available at 
www.u4.no/themes/ces/postconflict/odonnell.pdf (accessed on 17 September 2011). 
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States in transition are swiftly decentralising their authority by moving away from planned 
economies to liberalisation, and from unitary to plural democratic politics. In essence, the 
hegemony of state control on the economic and political aspect is diminishing gradually.
134
 
However, political corruption will have adverse effects on the application of the rule of law, 
which will be substituted „by the rule of whoever has the influence or the ability and 
willingness to pay.‟135Corruption flouts the rule of fairness, which is the cornerstone of the 
principle of the rule of law, by giving some people advantages and others not.
136
 
An example of the negative effect of political corruption on the rule of the law can be 
illustrated by the situation that occurred in Zimbabwe in 1988. Several ZANU PF party 
officials were involved in illegal purchasing of motor vehicles from a local car manufacturer 
and reselling them at a substantial mark-up in what was known as the „Willowgate scandal; 
which is cited as the most notorious case of corruption in Zimbabwe‟s history.137One of the 
officials, a cabinet minister at the time, Fredrick Shava, was arrested and prosecuted for 
corruption in that case. He was pardoned immediately after conviction by President Robert 
Mugabe. Today, he is the Zimbabwean ambassador to China. As a result of the presidential 
pardon of the minister convicted, the Attorney-General subsequently dropped the charges 
against other ministers and members of parliament.
138
 
                                                 
134 El-Ayouty, Y, et al „Combating Corruption for Development: the Rule of law, Transparency and 
Accountability‟ (UNPAN1 10 October 2002) available 
athttp://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan005786.pdf (accessed 17 September 2011). 
135Shihata, I (1997:451). 
136Uslaner, E M (2008:258). 
137Sithole, J „Corruption A Way of Life in Zimbabwe (Institute for War and Peace Reporting11 April 2008) 
available at  http://iwpr.net/report-news/corruption-way-life-zimbabwe (accessed on 21 September 2011). 
138Zhangazha, W „Presidential Pardons Should be Transparent‟ (Zimbabwe Independent 6 May 2011) available 
at http://allafrica.com/stories/201105091454.html (accessed on 22 September 2011). 
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4.3 Democratisation 
The term democracy, like political corruption, defies a common definition. For the purposes 
of this study, democracy shall be defined as „a system of governance in which rulers are held 
accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens acting indirectly through the 
competition and cooperation of their elected representatives‟.139Democratisation is therefore, 
a process whereby a country embraces such a system.
140
 
There are four main phases of democratisation, namely: the fall of the authoritarian regime; 
the transition; the consolidation; and the maturing of the political order.
141
Democratisation is 
attained when the following features are in place: a consensus has been arrived at on the 
political methods to elect a government into power; a new regime has attains authority to rule 
on the basis of a free and fair election; the new regime should have the power to enact new 
laws; and all the arms of the state founded by the new democracy enjoy absolute power over 
other bodies.
142
 
The negative effects of political corruption on democracy have been well documented. For 
example, Warren provided a detailed research on the effects of corruption on democracy, 
which can be summarised as follows: firstly, corruption interrupts the connection between 
collective decision making and the majority‟s authority to contribute in collective decisions 
by way of discussions or by vote. Secondly, corruption reduces efficient distribution of 
                                                 
139Schmitter, P.C and Karl, T.L (1991:76). 
140Hauss, C „Democratization‟ (The Conflict Resolution Information Source August 2003) available at 
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/democratization/ (accessed on 18 September 2011). 
141Nicolescu-Waggonner, C „The Negative Impact of Corruption on the Consolidation of Democracy‟ available 
atwww.democracy.uci.edu/.../democracy/.../The%20Negative%20Impact%20of%20Corruption%20on%20the%
20Cons (accessed on 18 September 2011). 
142Linz, J and Stephan, A (1996:3). 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
information to citizens, and by corollary, it decreases access to democracy and renders public 
office an instrument of private benefit. Thirdly, corruption weakens the principles of 
democracy because it forces people to have no self-assurance that policies are made for 
motives that are transparent and permissible, hence they become suspicious of public 
speeches and discussions. Finally, corruption undermines the ability of civil society to 
participate in democratic processes, thereby eroding trust in the institutions of the state.
143
 
In the context of the SADC states, the South African experience illustrates the effects of 
corruption on the consolidation of democracy. DuToit argues that political corruption in the 
form of patronage, whereby the state delivers social amenities, make appointments to the 
public service, and awards state a contract discriminately, based on identity, communal 
affiliation or partisan loyalty, exacerbate inequities and therefore directly undermines 
democracy in South Africa.
144
 
4.4 Legitimacy, Credibility and Effectiveness of the Transitional Government 
In order to fully comprehend the negative effects of political corruption on the legitimacy of a 
government in transition, three distinct labels or typologies of legitimacy, as a concept, have 
to be noted.
145
 The first meaning of legitimacy lies in the political concept, which has been 
defined by Lipset as the capability of a government to create and uphold the trust that the 
current governing institutions are the most suitable ones for the country.
146
 Secondly, 
legitimate in the legal sense is when a state enjoys legitimacy because it is recognised as 
                                                 
143 Warren, M (2004:328). 
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being in agreement with the law.
147
 The third meaning of legitimacy relates to the field of 
economics. In this case, legitimacy is measured, using the opinion of the public on the system 
of the economy i.e. if the economy is working effectively and efficiently enough to provide 
the most basic needs of the citizens then a government is considered legitimate.
148
Although 
coming from different disciplines, these definitions nevertheless prove that the concept of 
legitimacy is based on widespread support for the politicians, their political choices, and 
institutes.
149
Political corruption can pose some challenges on these different dimensions of 
the concept of legitimacy.
150
 
Legitimacy is an important aspect of transition. There is a presumption that the process of 
transition from its commencement to the consolidation phase creates the political 
establishments, legal framework and all the other mechanisms which exists in and outside the 
government structures, that facilitate citizens‟ participation and control of the politicians.151  
Moreover, legitimacy facilitates the provision of noticeable results, for instance, the delivery 
of necessary public goods and services to meet the minimum basic needs of citizens. It also 
strengthens the rule of law by requiring government to act in consonance with the law, and it 
promotes human rights.
152
 
The pernicious impact of political corruption on legitimacy can be drawn from the effects of 
corruption in general. Recently, researchers came up with decisive evidence which 
                                                 
147Friedrich, C (1963:186). 
148Dye, T.R (1990). 
149Blondel, J (1995:62). 
150Bekeer, H (2000:22). 
151 Andreev, S.A (2008:95). 
152 Andreev, S.A (2008:95). 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
corroborates the opinion that corruption leads to reduced legitimacy.
153
Corruption increases 
inequality and creates inefficiency. It damages the legitimacy of a government, be it 
democratic or a one-party state.
154
For instance, if political officials abuse their positions for 
personal enrichment, government projects become less effective and the effect of 
international and donor aid lose its value.
155
 By corollary, if the government is ineffective 
then it will not be able to provide basic amenities and will fail to establish its legitimacy. The 
other way corruption will erode the legitimacy of the government is when poverty is 
widespread and most people struggle on a daily basis to satisfy their basic needs whilst on the 
other hand, a few corrupt civil servants and politicians are living a luxurious lifestyle that is 
beyond the majority of the population .
156
 
An example of how political corruption can undermine the legitimacy of a government is 
illustrated by the 2011 demonstrations in Swaziland, against corruption. The government had 
been warned about its reckless expenditure. For instance, in 2010 the government budgeted 
R170 million for the royal family. In terms of the Royal Emoluments and Civil List Act (Act 
of 1998), each year an allocation has to be made from the national budget to cover 
expenditure associated with the monarchy.
157
The programs director at Freedom House, 
Robert Herman, commented on the legitimacy of the government of Swaziland, which he 
                                                 
153Porta, D (2000:205). 
154Sandgren, C (2008:966). 
155Rose-Ackerman, S (2008:4). 
156MukumMbaku,, J (2007:108). 
157Nxumalo, M „IMF should think hard before dictating changes to Swaziland‟ (Daily Maverick) available at, 
http://dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2011-04-07-imf-should-think-hard-before-dictating-changes-to-
swaziland (accessed on 2 October 2011). 
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said was forfeited by the latter‟s decision to disregard the important concerns of its citizens 
over the rate of maladministration and corruption within the government departments.
158
 
4.5 Transitional State Funds and Donor Aid 
Vito Tanzi states that political corruption negatively affects the resources allocation by 
diverting them away from the much needed intended destinations to the ones that will ensure 
some private advantages for the corrupt official.
159
Transitional governments have a lot of 
need for revenues to build new infrastructure and for other governmental functions. 
Therefore, if corruption increases the official level of expenditure it reduces the part of it 
which is needed for developing the country.
160
 
An important source of funding during transition comes from foreign donations. These are 
not exempt from abuse by corrupt state officials, as already illustrated in Chapter three of this 
paper. In the cases of Jacob Chiluba and Bakili Muluzi, both former presidents of Zambia and 
Malawi, respectively, were involved in embezzling significant amounts of donor funds. 
Therefore, it is no coincidence when political corruption researchers Chabal and Daloz argue 
that the misuse of foreign aid in the pursuit of political objectives is one of the major features 
of „aid dependency‟ in Africa.161 As it does to state revenue, political corruption in foreign 
aid takes away aid from the intended projects, hence severely undermines the usefulness and 
success of aid.
162
 
                                                 
158Freedom House, „Freedom House Condemns Government Crackdown in Swaziland‟ April 12, 2011available 
at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release=1394 (accessed on 3 October 2011). 
159Tanzi, V (1998:119). 
160Tanzi, V (1998:119). 
161Chabal, P and Daloz, P (1999). 
162 How is Development Aid undermined by Corruption? Available at 
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The ramifications of corruption are that it will not only make aid ineffective, but will also 
limit the amount of foreign aid to a country that is well-known to be corrupt. The two case 
studies of Zambia and Malawi can illustrate this point clearly. In 2001 the major donors to 
Malawi suspended donor aid and even asked for a reimbursement of the amounts already 
disbursed due to massive political corruption.
163
Similarly, in 2009 the Dutch and Swedish 
governments put a hold on any financial assistance to the government of Zambia for health 
projects on allegations of corruption. The decision was made after a whistle-blower informed 
the Zambia's Anti-Corruption Commission [ACC] about the embezzlement case of at least 
US$2 million that was stolen by senior government officials from the from the Ministry 
health.
164
 
However, the effects of corruption on donor aid is complicated mainly because aid is 
fungible, in that it leads to an unintended minimal increase in public expenditure which 
corresponds to an influx of aid.
165
 As a result, it is prudent to take a holistic approach when 
assessing the influence and quality of overall government expenditure, as opposed to 
concentrating on one department‟s spending or on whether the funds were used for the 
purposes for which they were originally meant.
166
 For example, Santiso noted that foreign aid 
may be donated to enable the recipient country to build a school, which indeed the recipient 
may use for that purpose, however, because of the availability of aid funds to build the school 
could make it possible for the recipient to use the resulting savings to buy sophisticated 
                                                 
163 „Malawi Donors Suspend Aid‟ (BBC News 19 November 2001) available 
athttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1665141.stm (accessed on 23 September 2011). 
164 „Health Funding Frozen after Corruption Alleged‟ (Plus News Zambia: 27 May 2009) available at 
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weapons whose purchase may provide opportunities for illegally diverting funds into 
individuals‟ pockets than school construction could.167 
In the SADC region, the case of the management of donor aid in Mozambique illustrates this 
reasoning quite well. This extract by Joseph Hanlon describes it better: 
„The Mozambican elite have become highly skilled at ensuring that management of 
donor money is transparent and clear. The predatory elite do not steal donors‟ funds; instead 
they rob banks, skim public works contracts, demand shares in investments, and smuggle 
drugs and other goods and they ensure that the justice system does not work so they cannot 
be caught. When donors gave the government an extra $122 million at the Consultative 
Group meeting in October 2001, they were giving the government enough money to plug the 
hole in the banking system for that year, and sending a clear message that donor money could 
be used to cover murder and theft of non-aid funds, so long as it was done publicly and 
transparently.‟168 
This extract clearly explains how ingeniously donor money can be corruptly used by the state 
officials. 
4.6 Human Rights Violations 
Political corruption may lead to suppression of the enjoyment of all the fundamental human 
rights.
169
However, even though corruption may pose  a threat on the enjoyment of human 
rights, this is not one and the same with violation of human rights, and to escape such 
                                                 
167Quoted in Ampratwum, E.F (2008:83). 
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oversimplifications it is relevant to examine  how  corruption can lead to a practice of  human 
rights violation.
170
 
First, there should be an obligation on the states concerned. There are basically three levels of 
state obligations in relation to human rights, namely to: respect; protect; and fulfil.
171
The duty 
to „respect‟ entails that the State should desist from any practices that may take away 
individuals ability to satisfy rights by their own means if they are in a position to do so. The 
duty to „protect‟ requires the State to inhibit violations of human rights by any other 
individuals or element. Non-compliance with this obligation may be a vital determinant of 
state responsibility in corruption cases.
172
 The third obligation is pertinent to privatisation 
processes, for instance, the privatisation of public services such as health, transport or 
telecommunications may increase chances for corruption and thus indirectly harm the 
satisfaction of a number of rights, such as access to clean water.
173
The third obligation to 
fulfil requires States to adopt methods that will guarantee that everyone has access to basic 
needs that are provided in human rights instruments, which they do not have means to satisfy 
without the assistance of the state. 
Corruption may directly violate a human right when a corruption is intentionally used as a 
means to violate human rights. Secondly, corruption can be a necessary contribution linked to 
a series of actions that will lead to abuse of human rights. In this case, violation of human 
rights is connected to an act of corruption which triggers the events that directly violate the 
concerned right. Thirdly, corruption can play a more remote role in human rights violations, 
                                                 
170Bacio-Terracino, J „Corruption as a Violation of Human Rights‟ available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1107918 (accessed on 23 September 2011). 
171 International Council on Human Rights Policy and Transparency International (2009:22). 
172 International Council on Human Rights Policy and Transparency International (2009:22). 
173 International Council on Human Rights Policy and Transparency International (2009:23). 
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for example, electoral corruption can raise suspicions about the truthfulness of the results, 
people may react by demonstrations, strikes, protests etc. and the law enforcement may use 
unlawful force to quell the demonstrations violating fundamental rights such as torture, right 
to life and unlawful arrests in the process.
174
 
All three situations can be analysed from the cases discussed so far. The case of patronage in 
Zimbabwe illustrates the first case. For instance, because of patronage only ZANU PF 
supporters can get appointed in government and diplomatic jobs, thus violating the rights of 
other Zimbabweans of access to employment free from political discrimination. The second 
situation can be related to the case of embezzlement in Zambia. When Chiluba embezzled 
donor funds meant for public health, the recipients of those health facilities were denied of 
their right to access health facilities. The third situation can be illustrated in Swaziland during 
the demonstrations, protestors rights such as the freedom of movement, association, 
expression, right to life, were violated in the state-sponsored violence that ensured. 
4.7 Conclusion 
Political corruption in its different manifestations as addressed in chapter two of this paper 
can pose multiple challenges for states undergoing transition into democracy. As highlighted 
above, the ramifications of political corruption on the rule of law, democratisation, legitimacy 
of the government, enjoyment of human rights and the state revenue cannot be 
underestimated. The discipline of transitional justice must engage with the so-called second 
generation human rights, such as economic crimes and political corruption in the same way it 
deals with violations of civil and political rights. 
175
 
                                                 
174 International Council on Human Rights Policy and Transparency International (2009:25). 
175See in general Carranza, R (2008: 310-330). 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter is an overview of the whole research paper, summarising the main arguments 
and salient findings in the trends of political corruption in the SADC region. It will then draw 
some conclusions from the same findings and attempt to offer both specific and general 
recommendations to solve the challenges posed by political corruption in those selected 
countries of the SADC region that are subjects of this study. 
5.2 Summary 
An analysis of transitional states of the SADC region reveals a trend of a certain typologies of 
political corruption. This is bribery, trading in influence, patronage, electoral fraud, 
embezzlement and involvement in organised crime. These types of political corruption are 
closely related to the effect of consolidation of political power and self-enrichment, a 
characteristic of politics during transition. Therefore an analysis of political corruption can be 
understood as an issue linked to power and power relations.
176
 
In chapter three of this research paper, it can be deduced that the underlying causes and 
conditions for political corruption in the region are mainly: occurrence of a power vacuum; 
diminished social control; close connection between political power and access to economic 
leverage; lack of resources within the law enforcement structures; and unbridled 
opportunism. Further, political corruption is committed by the so-called PEPs, as illustrated 
by all the cases discussed in this research paper, including heads of states and senior 
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politicians. In all these cases no prosecution was successful except in the Zimbabwean and 
South African cases of Fredrick Shava and Shabir Shaik. However, in the former case the 
minister concerned was pardoned immediately after conviction and in the latter, Shaik was 
released early from prison on medical parole after serving only two years and four months of 
his 15-year term.
177
 
The fourth chapter canvassed the costs and effects of political corruption in transitional states 
of the SADC region. Citing concrete examples and making reference to the cases discussed in 
the previous chapters, it points out how political corruption can lead to violation of human 
rights, the rule of law, democracy, and legitimacy of the state and economic development by 
abusing states revenue. 
5.3 Conclusion 
Political corruption can easily thrive under transitional periods. The process of transition can 
influence corruption because it involves the development and institutionalisation of 
authoritative norms of political office and political responsibility. If public officials evade 
these norms then political corruption will simply flourish.
178
 
The costs of political corruption on states pursuing democracy are devastating. Thus, by 
unbundling corruption in transition, revelations of the extent to which these costs vary as a 
result of different patterns of corruption becomes clear.
179
Political corruption can derail 
transitional processes.  
                                                 
177„Schabir Shaik back in prison‟ (News 24, 13 March 2011) available at http://www.news24.com/ 
SouthAfrica/News/Schabir-Shaik-back-in-prison-20110314 (accessed on 3 October 2011). 
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Political corruption is not addressed adequately in the SADC region due to lack of political 
will, lack of capacity to deal with complex corruption cases during the early phases of a 
transition, a weak civil society and a muzzled media (except in South Africa). Robin Hodess 
notes that the knowledge of political corruption often affects societies but bureaucrats 
charged with political corruption are tough to prosecute or convict, some of them may die 
before they are prosecuted.
180
 
5.3 Recommendations 
5.3.1 Legal Remedies 
5.3.1.1National Legislation 
Some of the selected countries legislation dedicated to combat corruption have defined the 
term corruption in a very restricted sense and are therefore recommended to widen the 
definition to include other corrupt acts. According to Goredema, it is apparent that during the 
phases of economic and political transition in the region corruption will go beyond the 
traditional transgressions such as bribery and extortion. He argues that legislation should be 
amended to include other forms of corruption in order to avoid the bypassing of proper 
systems and the suppression of corrupt practices. 
181
 
                                                 
180Hodess, R „Political corruption‟ available at 
http://www.uneca.org/itca/governance/Documents/Introduction_to_political_corruption.pdf (accessed on 6 
October 2011). 
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5.3.1.2 Codes of Conduct 
An appropriate way of dealing with unbridled opportunism is by establishing legal ethics and 
codes of conducts.
182
Pelizzo and Stapenhurst recommend that an ethics regime, in the form of 
either ethics codes or codes of conduct, represents a valuable anti-corruption tool.
183
It has 
been noted that all the countries under discussion in this paper have rules and regulations 
which guide the conduct of heads of states, parliamentarians, and senior government officials. 
However, states are recommended to periodically review their codes of conduct with the view 
to achieving transparency and accountability. „An institution which has outdated policies and 
regulations is a fertile ground for corruption.‟184States Parties are also recommended to adopt 
best practices from the regions such as the South Africa, which is itself not free of corruption. 
5.3.1.3 Asset Declaration and Financial Disclosures Laws 
5.3.1.3.1 Adopt Asset Declaration Legislation 
In Swaziland and Zimbabwe assets disclosure is not required. In Malawi, Mozambique and 
Zambia disclosure is required but cannot be made public. In South Africa it is accessible to 
the public.
185
Corruption is difficult to prove, asset declaration laws and rules can assist in 
both prevention and detection of political corruption.
186
For example, they can help anticipate 
potential conflicts of interest before misconduct occurs. Filing of false and misleading 
                                                 
182 „Code of conduct is a system of rules and regulations governing human behaviour in a particular 
environment. It defines what may and may not be done and stipulates the process for commissioning 
unacceptable behaviour in the context of that environment‟ See Matsheza, P and Kunaka, C (2000:39). 
183Pelizzo, R and Stapenhurst, R (2006:197). 
184National Anti-Corruption Strategy Malawi 4. 
185
Income and asset disclosure in World Bank client countries 
186 U4 Anti-Corruption Resources Centre „African experience of asset declarations‟ available at 
http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/query.cfm?id=160 (accessed on 1 October 2011). 
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declarations is easier to monitor, detect and punish.
187
By corollary, disclosures should be 
made public, subjecting them to strict rules of confidentiality will limit transparency.
188
 
5.3.1.3.2 Disclosure should be periodically 
It is recommended that those SADC states without asset declaration laws enact asset 
declaration laws and rules to fight corruption by politicians.  
It is further recommended that submissions should be made periodically. Filers must update 
their submission whenever there is a “significant” change of their assets and officials should 
make a disclosure upon entering government and upon leaving.
189
For example, Article 34(5) 
(b) of the Zambian Constitution states that a Presidential candidate is under obligation to 
make a statutory declaration of his assets and liabilities, but there is no law that requires the 
President to file declarations of assets and liabilities after assuming office and for the duration 
of his tenure as President. 
190
The case of Chiluba emphasises the need for the President to 
declare his assets and liabilities on a regular basis to a body or institution with the capacity to 
monitor this.
191
 
                                                 
187 U4 Anti-Corruption Resources Centre „African experience of asset declarations‟ available at 
http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/query.cfm?id=160 (accessed on 1 October 2011). 
188Gastrow, P and Mosse, M „Mozambique: Threats posed by the penetration of criminal networks‟ (19 April 
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available at 
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In this area, SADC states can seek assistance on the designing and implementation of asset 
declaration laws from the World Bank Group (WBG) and the UNODC-STAR initiatives,  
which assist with capacity building for government officials and civic society practitioners 
involved in the implementation and daily management of asset and income disclosure 
systems and provide information such as practice manuals on the policy discourse around this 
subject.
192
 
5.3.1.4 Criminalise illicit enrichment 
SADC states should criminalise illicit enrichment. „Illicit enrichment is defined as a 
significant increase in the assets of a public official that he or she cannot reasonably explain 
in relation to his or her lawful income.‟193The creation of the offence of illicit enrichment has 
been useful as a deterrent to political corruption in many jurisdictions.
194
This is mainly 
because illicit enrichment is a predicate offence of corruption.
195
 
5.3.1.5 Specialised Ant- Corruption Courts  
SADC countries should adopt a judicial framework of specialised anti-corruption courts. In 
the alternative they need to have specialised prosecutors to handle corruption cases. Some 
                                                 
192 World Bank and UNODC „Asset And Income Declaration Guide Concept Note‟(February 11, 2009) 
available at  http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSARI/Resources/AssetIncome Declaration Guide.pdf 
(accessed on 1 0ctober 2011) 
193 AU Convention against Corruption, Article 1. 
194UNODC (2006:103). 
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countries such as Kenya, Pakistan and the Philippines have established specialised criminal 
courts for corruption.
196
 
5.3.1.6 Reforms to the SADC Protocol against Corruption 
All the countries under review have signed the SADC Protocol against Corruption. However, 
Mozambique and Swaziland are yet to ratify the Protocol.
197
 The Information appears in the 
Table 1 below 
Table 1. 
No Country Signature Ratification/Accession 
1 Malawi 14/08/2001 27/09/2002 
2 Mozambique 14/08/2001 Not yet ratified 
3 South Africa 14/08/2001 15/05/2003 
4 Swaziland 14/08/2001 Not ratified 
5 Zambia 14/08/2003 08/07/2003 
6 Zimbabwe 14/08/2003 08/10/2004 
 
                                                 
196U4 Anticorruption Resources Centre „Supporting Zambian Judicial Capacity to handle Corruption Cases‟ (23 
May 2008) available at http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/query.cfm?id=169 (accessed on 1 October 2011). 
197  Institute for Security Studies „A Comparative Analysis: SADC Protocol against Corruption (2001) AU 
Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2003) UN Convention against Corruption (2003)‟ 
(November 2004) available at http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Other/CorruptHandbookNov04/Intro.pdf (accessed on 
1 October 2011). 
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In order to address the problem of political corruption the SADC Protocol against Corruption 
needs to be reviewed in the following respects: 
1. On the article relating to the embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of 
property by a public official 
Article 3(1) (d) of the SADC Protocol only deals with “diversion” of such property. UNCAC 
deals with the “embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion” by a public official of 
any property, public or private funds or securities in more detailed manner in Article 17. 
Therefore, the SADC Protocol should be amended to include misappropriation and other 
diversion to the corruption crime of embezzlement. 
2. Inclusion of the crime of obstruction of justice in the Protocol. 
This offence can be used by PEPs to avoid accountability. The SADC Protocol against 
Corruption does not criminalise this offence. It is recommended that the Protocol should copy 
Article 25 of the UN Convention which requires that each States Party must adopt measures 
necessary to establish obstruction of Justice as a criminal offence.
198
 
3. Sanctions 
The SADC Protocol does not deal with sanctions or penalties in case of the commission of an 
offence or non-compliance with prescribed measures. It is recommended that the Protocol 
should be revised and take into account the sanctioning and punishment offence and non-
compliance. UNCAC, for example, specifically provides for sanctions.  
                                                 
198Babu, R „The United Nations Convention against Corruption: A Critical Overview‟ (1 March 2006) available 
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4. As noted in the discussion on the causes of corruption that transitional states attract foreign 
business. This, in turn, can lead to foreign officials bribing local politicians. This has been 
noted by Nsereko and Kebonang that „there is problem of foreign companies or businessmen 
offering bribes to local state officials. This is a major menace in the SADC region, as it 
involves high government officials, powerful transnational corporations and colossal sums of 
money.
199
 The SADC Protocol against Corruption does not deal adequately with this issue. It 
was noted that the wording in the SADC Protocol referring to “by a public official” is wrong 
and should actually be similar to the wording in the AU Convention, namely, “to a public 
official”.200 
5.3.2 Non-Legal Remedies 
5.3.2.1 Implementation of Social Control Mechanisms 
Social control mechanisms are fundamental in the fight against corruption.
201
The lack of 
social control mechanisms was attributed as one of the major causes of political corruption in 
the previous chapters. By corollary, implementation of social control mechanisms can help to 
prevent corruption in the region. 
These mechanisms must include „strategic anti-corruption steering committees, operational 
watchdogs working within government institutions composed of civil society and government 
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Nsereko, D.D.N and Kebonang, Z (2005:301). 
200
Institute for Security Studies „A Comparative Analysis: SADC Protocol against Corruption (2001) AU 
Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2003) UN Convention against Corruption (2003)‟ 
(November 2004) available at http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Other/CorruptHandbookNov04/Intro.pdf  (accessed on 
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Empowering the Victims of Corruption though Social Control Mechanisms „Empowering the Victims of 
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officials working together. Those operational mixed watchdog bodies must cover monitoring 
and evaluation of local and central government affairs such as budget-related policies, 
personnel-related matters, public investment planning, complaint matters and public 
information channels.‟202 
5.3.2.2 The role of civil society 
SADC countries should promote civil society in the fight against corruption, including 
community and rural-based organisations. Shelley‟s studies on the role of civic society in the 
fight against corruption in Russia and Ukraine during the transition from socialism revealed 
that civic society pressure groups are „potent forces in controlling corruption than the explicit 
anti-corruption activists because they reflect deep seated indigenous concerns of the citizenry 
and have not developed as a response to foreign stimuli to create anti-corruption 
movements‟.203 
5.4.3 Promote the Media and Investigative Journalism 
5.4.3.1 The Media 
The media has a dual role to play as an anti-corruption tool. Firstly, it raises public awareness 
about the causes, consequences and the possible solutions of curbing corruption and 
moreover it investigates and report incidents of political corruption.
204
Thus, media should be 
promoted in general and, in particular, investigative journalism should be promoted in the 
SADC region to fight political corruption. 
                                                 
202 Empowering the Victims of Corruption though Social Control Mechanisms „Empowering the Victims of 
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5.4.4.2 Investigative Journalism 
Investigative journalism is defined as „in-depth, long-term research and reporting including 
documentary research and the use of public and private records, extensive interviewing and 
other crime-solving tools and methods such as undercover reporting, hidden cameras, and 
surveillance.‟205 Investigative journalism skills need to be mastered and learned.206Therefore 
the SADC region media should promote the role of investigative journalism. There are lots of 
organisations that offer capacity building for investigative journalism, for example the World 
Bank. It is recommended that SADC media houses should utilise these opportunities in order 
to acquire and enhance skills on the subject. 
Investigative journalism is expensive and time-consuming and the interest of companies 
advertising in the media may obstruct investigative journalism. As a result, it is not lucrative 
to corporate media.
207
Civic society and the media can combine resources to promote 
investigative journalism. It is recommended that other SADC countries should follow the 
example of the South African Mail and Guardian Centre for Investigative Journalism also 
known as the amaBhungane. This institute aims to develop investigative journalism in the 
public interest and is mandated to produce major investigative stories in the public interest.
208
 
For example, it has played a pivotal role in exposing political corruption in South Africa 
amongst other cases  
      *** 
                                                 
205 Philippine Centre for Investigative Journalism„Investigative Reporting‟ available at 
pcij.org/training/Investigative%20Reporting.doc(accessed on 29 September 2011). 
206Macdonell, R and Pesic, M (2006:111). 
207Kotkin, S and Sajo, A (2002:258). 
208M&G Centre for Investigative Journalism available athttp://amabhungane.co.za/section/investigations 
(accessed on 24 September 2011). 
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